Snyder question the finding of a significant short-run effect, arguing that it is probably caused by Castro's distorting key observations for political ends. They show that, when the Batista figures are substituted for these key years (1957 and 1958) , this significant, positive short-run effect dis appears. Thus, they conclude, the energy consumption measure is vulner able to politically motivated manipulation and cannot serve as a reliable national economic indicator in a revolutionary situation. I disagree.
The Castro and Batista figures on energy consumption for 1957 and 1958 do in fact differ widely. The question is, Why this difference? A de finitive answer is of course impossible, but I will put forward a few guesses. The explanations can be grouped into two broad categories: " fu d g in g " and measurement error. I would first like to consider fudging, defined as ma nipulation of a statistic for political purposes. With regard to the Cuban case, there are two basic possibilities: Castro fudged the 1957 and 1958 figures, or Batista did. Pilarski and Snyder entertain only the first possi bility. However, inspection of the data suggests that the Batista team may actually be the culprits. Look at the scatterplot provided by Pilarski and Snyder. The Batista figures for 1957 and 1958 deviate seriously from the straight line formed by the observations on previous years (fit a ruler to the circled dots, 1949-56). In fact, if we accept these Batista figures, we are forced to conclude that, during his last two years in power, the Cuban economy was doing better than ever! Given that this outcome is so un likely, the implication is strong that Batista altered the data to achieve it. These energy consumption data, then, can be made to appear compatible with the fudging hypothesis, although the fudging may have been com mitted by Batista rather than Castro. However, I reject this interpretation in favor of a measurement error hypothesis. There might be at least two kinds of measurement error operating: random measurement error and "revolutionary" measurement error. The deviations (from the 1949-56 line) represented by the 1957 and 1958 observations can be explained by the notion of revolutionary measurement error. That is, the revolutionary situation prevailing in 1957 and 1958 made it unusually difficult to get complete, accurate data. Therefore, the Batista energy consumption esti mates of those years were very preliminary. Before Batista's statisticians could revise these estimates, Castro came to power. Castro's statisticians, benefiting from the more complete data finally in on 1957 and 1958, were able to make more precise estimates. Empirical evidence that the Castro estimates are more accurate comes from the fact that they are much closer to the projection of a straight line from the 1949-56 points. In other words, the Castro revisions merely reflect the more complete data which even tually became available. Milder instances of this revision process occur throughout the entire series; regardless of whether the year is during the Batista or Castro eras, the figures tend to be revised in later volumes of the statistical yearbooks, in keeping with the more complete information that becomes available.
Thus, with regard to energy consumption, Castro's statisticians did not fudge; they merely had better data. Such a conclusion is not as contro versial as it may sound. We are not talking about measuring politically sensitive variables like GNP or sugar production. Neither officials, aca demics, nor the public regarded energy consumption as a central economic indicator. Undoubtedly, unheralded government bureaucrats went along quietly gathering data on energy consumption, much as they had always done. After all, if sugar production data were left unaltered by Castro's statisticians, it seems unlikely that they would alter the obscure energy consumption figures (even critic Mesa-Lago concedes there was no sugar data manipulation until 1965; my analysis suggests Castro never manipu lated the sugar data; see p. 1133).
Because of the foregoing reasons, I must accept the energy consumption series as I originally compiled it (including the "Castro" data on 1957 and 1958). An ITS analysis of this series indicates that the revolution had a positive, significant, short-run economic effect. I might add that this con clusion squares with the general impression of many observers of the Cuban economic scene immediately after the revolution.
Granting the reliability of these energy data brings us to the second question, To what extent are the observed changes caused by the revolu tion? In seeking an answer, I estimated the ITS model discussed above. From a methodological point of view, a revolution seems an ideal "inter ruption" to assess, because it so resists the confounding influence of third variables. That is, revolution represents such a massive manipulation that any significant changes afterward would almost undoubtedly be attribut able to it. However, as with any quasi-experimental design, the confound ing potential of third variables must be considered. A prime candidate here is the U.S. embargo, which began at almost the same time. One way to handle the embargo is simply to regard it as part of the revolutionary in terruption, arguing that a revolution involves internal and external changes, for example, a shift in trade patterns. Then, any observed effect is assign able to the revolution, but with the understanding that the revolution en compasses external as well as internal events.
Another way to handle the issue is to separate the internal aspects of revolutionary change from the external ones. A precise partitioning into internal and external revolutionary effects is problematic in the Cuban case, because the U.S. embargo began in 1960. Still, this means there is one year, 1959, when the Cuban revolution was operating free of an embargo. For that year, the first year of the revolution, energy consumption increased significantly from 1958, as my ITS analysis shows. This suggests that, at least in the short run, a domestic revolution produces a positive economic effect.
It is more difficult to separate unambiguously the long-run effect of the domestic revolution from that of the U.S. embargo, as I am at pains to make clear in my discussion (p. 1146). I nowhere imply that "the United States must shoulder all the blame for Cuba's lower postrevolutionary growth rate," as Pilarski and Snyder charge. Instead, I indicate that the U.S. embargo is one of the "external influences" operating and "may share responsibility for the drop in economic output" (p. 1146, italics added). I go on to state, "But, at about the same time the embargo was taking hold, important internal changes in Cuba were occurring, for example, the transition to a socialist state was being completed, and the Soviet Union was assuming a major role. Therefore, by the 1960-61 period, major vari ables potentially influencing growth are once again confounded" (p. 1146).
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